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Punitive Damages and the Louisiana Constitution: Don't
Leave Home Without It
Donald C. Massey
Martin A. Stern-
While considerable attention has been paid of late to the constraints of the
United States Constitution on punitive damages, the extent to which the
Louisiana Constitution may provide its own constraints has been largely ignored.
Indeed, there is only one reported case in which the effect of the Louisiana
Constitution on punitive damages has even been addressed,' and it is respectfully
submitted that while this opinion is to be applauded for addressing the subject,
it is wrong in its method and arguably wrong in its result.
This article shows first that the courts must not only look to the Louisiana
Constitution when considering an award of punitive damages under Louisiana
law, but also that the Louisiana Constitution must be looked to before the federal
Constitution is even reached. More particularly, both the United States and
Louisiana Supreme Courts have expressly held that it is improper to consider an
argument under the federal Constitution before all state law remedies have been
exhausted, including any available argument under the Louisiana Constitution.'
Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court has held that pursuant to the basic concept
of federalism, it is state law-not federal law-which enjoys primacy in
protecting individual rights.' Thus, in analyzing what protections should be
afforded against a claim for punitive damages, the Louisiana Constitution must
be looked to before the federal Constitution.
Second, this article shows that the Declaration of Rights in the Louisiana
Constitution affords much greater protection from punitive damages than does
the Bill of Rights, its federal counterpart. In the words of Justice Tate, "the
individual rights guaranteed by our state constitution's declaration of individual
rights (Article I) represent more specific protections of the individual against
governmental power than those found in the federal Constitution's [B]ill of
[R]ights, and they may represent broader protection of the individual."
Finally, this article discusses how certain articles of the Louisiana
Declaration of Rights may constrain claims of punitive damages. This discussion
is by no means exhaustive, but includes protections such as the right to
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bifurcated trials, the right to a heightened burden of proof, the right against
excessive punishment, the right against double jeopardy, and the right against
self-incrimination.
First, however, it is appropriate to place this entire discussion in context-a
context which is characterized by heated controversy over the role that punitive
damages should play under the law. Also, before discussing how the Louisiana
Constitution should affect this controversy, this article briefly recapitulates how
the United States Supreme Court has reacted to the controversy of punitive
damages under the federal Constitution.
I. THE RECENT CONTROVERSY
"As recently as a decade ago, the largest award of punitive damages
affirmed by an appellate court in a products liability case was $250,000. Since
then, awards more than thirty times as high have been sustained on appeal."
Although it has already been over six years since these words were written, this
passage describes the historical trend which, more than anything else, explains
why punitive damages have become one of the most controversial issues on the
legal scene. The issue has become so important that it has not only attracted
widespread attention among lawyers,6 but even among the public at large
As awards of punitive damages have escalated, commentators have sharply
divided as to whether these awards advance or inhibit societal goals. The
proponents of punitive damages argue that they allow private citizens to act as
private attorneys general-in effect to deter reckless conduct which compensatory
damages alone fail to deter. They point out that large punitive damages awards
are relatively rare and that there are circumstances in which only such a large
award has the power to change the attitudes of corporate America. The
opponents of punitive damages argue that they have spiraled out control, are
inconsistently applied, are unpredictable, and that there are virtually no checks
and balances on the virtually unfettered discretion of the jury to decide whether
and how much to award.
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN LOUISIANA
The attention paid to punitive damages on a national level has at least been
equaled by the attention paid to this subject in Louisiana. In 1995, an entire
5. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 282, 109 S. Ct. 2909,
2923-24 (1989) (citations omitted).
6. The American Bar Association Section of Litigation saw fit o issue a special report on the
subject in 1986. See Punitive Damages: A Constructive Examination-Report of the Special
Committee on Punitive Damages, 1986 A. B. A. Sec. Litig.
7. See, e.g., Andrea Sachs, A Blow to Big Business: The Supreme Court Upholds a Punitive
$1 Million Jury Verdict, Time, Mar. 18, 1991, at 71; Mary W. Walsh, Filing of Punitive Damages
Claims is Focus of Increasing Controversy, Wall St. J., Nov. 12, 1984, at 27.
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issue of the Louisiana Bar Journal, the official journal of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, was devoted to punitive damages.' This journal included a
discussion of the pros and cons of punitive damages which closely parallels the
debate on the national scene.9 Furthermore, the debate in Louisiana has been
more than academic; there were ten separate bills introduced in the Louisiana
legislature in 1995 relating to punitive damages.'0
Unlike many states, Louisiana permits punitive damage claims only where
specifically provided for by statute." There are numerous examples of
Louisiana Revised Statutes which provide for punitive damages in Louisiana,
ranging from violation of consumer credit laws, 2 to violation of the Dairy
Stabilization Law, 3 to violation of the Insurance Code, 4 and many other
examples in between. These provisions, however, provide only limited punitive
damages, usually in the form of triple the actual damages.
The punitive damage provisions in the Louisiana Civil Code, on the other
hand, provide for unlimited punitive damages. Until very recently, these
unlimited punitive damages were provided for in three situations:
(1) Art. 2315.3. Additional damages, storage handling, and
transportation of hazardous substances
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages
may be awarded, if it is proved that plaintiff's injuries were caused by
the defendant's wanton or reckless disregard for public safety in the
storage, handling, or transportation of hazardous or toxic substances.
As used in this Article, the term hazardous or toxic substances shall not
include electricity."
(2) Art. 2315.4. Additional damages; intoxicated defendant
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages
may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is
based were caused by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and
safety of others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a
motor vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries.6
8. See Daniel J. Shapiro, Punitive Damages in Louisiana: A Year of Controversy, 43 La. BJ.
253 (1995). Similarly, this article itself appears in a symposium devoted exclusively to the subject
of punitive damages.
9. Id. at 256-63.
10. Id. at 269-70 (discussing La. R.S. 23:1032(AXIXa); S.B. No. 567; S.B. No. 580; S.B. No.
809; H.B. No. 1641; and H.B. No. 1641).
11. See, e.g., Billiot v. British Petroleum Oil Co., 645 So. 2d 604,612 (La. 1994); International
Harvester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988).
12. See La. R.S. 9:3552 (1991 & Supp. 1996).
13. See La. R.S. 3:4116 (1987).
14. See La. R.S. 22:657-658 (1995 & Supp. 1996).
15. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.3.
16. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.4.
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(3) Art. 2315.7. Liability for damages caused by criminal sexual
activity occurring during childhood
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages
may be awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is
based were caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights
and safety of the person through criminal sexual activity which occurred
when the victim was seventeen years old or younger, regardless of
whether the defendant was prosecuted for his or her acts. The
provisions of this Article shall be applicable only to the perpetrator of
the criminal sexual activity.'
7
.In the 1996 Extraordinary Session, however, the legislature repealed Article
2315.3 providing for punitive damages in connection with the handling of
hazardous substances.' 8 Thus, at present, Louisiana law provides for unlimited
punitive damages for drunk driving and criminal sexual activity against a minor.
There are, however, still cases pending which seek unlimited punitive damages
for the alleged reckless handling of hazardous substances.
III. THE RESPONSE UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
It is against the backdrop of controversy on a national level that the United
States Supreme Court has taken up the issue of punitive damages. It is not the
purpose of this article to analyze the Supreme Court's treatment of punitive
damages under the federal Constitution; this has already been the subject of
many other articles.' 9 However, it is necessary to summarize here what the
United States Supreme Court has done, if only to frame the same issue as it
arises in the context of the Louisiana Constitution.
For years the Supreme Court acknowledged the controversy surrounding
punitive damages, but declined to address whether punitive damages were in any
way constrained by the federal Constitution. In making the case for the constitu-
tional reform of punitive damages in 1983, Professor Malcolm Wheeler noted
that while "several courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have
expressly recognized the existence of arbitrariness and prejudice in many punitive
damage awards,"2 ° "[t]he Supreme Court has never determined whether or
17. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.7.
18. Act No. 2 of the 1996 First Extraordinary Session of the Louisiana Legislature.
19. See, e.g., Janice Kemp, The Continuing Appeal of Punitive Damages: An Analysis of
Constitutional and Other Challenges to Punitive Damage, Post-Haslip and Moriel, 26 Tex. Tech L.
Rev. 1 (1995); Sandra L. Nunn, The Due Process Ramifications of Punitive Damages, Continued:
TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993), 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1029
(1995); William H. Volz & Michael C. Fayz, Punitive Damages and the Due Process Clause: The
Search for Constitutional Standards, 69 U. Det. Mercy L. Rev. 459 (1992); David G. Owen, A
Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 363 (1994).
20. Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Casefor Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures,
69 Va. L. Rev. 269, 271 (1983).
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not the procedures used in private punitive damages actions satisfy due
process."'"
In Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,' the issue was put squarely
before the Court when a health insurer argued that a punitive damage award
violated its due process rights. The insurer had been ordered to pay $1.6 million
by a Mississippi court for its bad-faith refusal to pay an insurance claim.
Finding that the issue had not been adequately raised before the Mississippi
courts, the Supreme Court declined to rule on the issue, since to do so "would
short-circuit a number of less intrusive, and possibly more appropriate,
resolutions."
Justice O'Connor, however, wrote a separate concurring opinion in which
she stated that the award "touched on a due process issue that I think is worthy
of the Court's attention in an appropriate case."' Justice O'Connor was
particularly troubled by the total lack of meaningful standards in Mississippi for
determining the appropriate amount of punitive damages:
As the Mississippi Supreme Court said, "the determination of the
amount of punitive damages is a matter committed solely to the
authority and discretion of the jury." This grant of wholly standardless
discretion to determine the severity of punishment appears inconsistent
with due process .... Nothing in Mississippi law warned appellant that
by committing a tort that caused $20,000 of actual damages, it could
expect to incur a $1.6 million punitive damages award. 5
The following year, in Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc.,26 the Court ruled narrowly that awards of punitive damages to private
plaintiffs are not constrained by the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment." The majority recognized that "punitive damages advance the
interests of punishment and deterrence, which are also among the interests
advanced by the criminal law,' 28 but it held that the Eighth Amendment "does
not constrain an award of money damages in a civil suit when the government
neither has prosecuted the action nor has any right to receive a share of the
damages awarded.
29
Although Justice O'Connor concurred in the holding, she was again
compelled to write separately, this time to express her concern over the amount
of the punitive damage award which "was 117 times the actual damages suffered
21. Id. at 273.
22. 486 U.S. 71, 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988).
23. Id. at 79-80, 108 S. Ct. at 1651.
24. Id. at 87, 108 S. Ct. at 1655.
25. Id. at 88, 108 S. Ct. at 1656 (citations omitted).
26. 492 U.S. 257, 280, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 2923 (1989).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 275, 109 S. Ct. at 2920.
29. Id. at 264, 109 S. Ct. at 2914.
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by [plaintiff]."3  Similarly, in a separate concurrence joined in by Justice
Marshall, Justice Brennan suggested that "the Due Process Clause forbids
damages awards that are 'grossly excessive,' or 'so severe and oppressive as to
be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.' 31
Justice Brennan reasoned:
[T]he jury in this case was sent to the jury room with nothing more
than the following terse instruction: "In determining the amount of
punitive damages.... you may take into account the character of the
defendants, their financial standing, and the nature of their acts."
Guidance like this is scarcely better than no guidance at all. I do not
suggest that the instruction itself was in error; indeed, it appears to have
been a correct statement of Vermont law. The point is, rather, that the
instruction reveals a deeper flaw: the fact that punitive damages are
imposed by juries guided by little more than an admonition to do what
they think is best.32
Then, in 1991, the watershed decision of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance
Company v. Haslip33 was handed down. As foreshadowed by the earlier
concurring opinions of Justices O'Connor, Brennan and Marshall, the Court held
that both the amount of and procedure for adjudicating punitive damages must
not offend due process. After years of skirting the issue, the Court had finally
made clear that punitive damages are, in fact, constrained by the United States
Constitution.
The majority opinion, however, sheds little light on what does and does not
meet due process. With respect to the amount of punitive damages that can be
awarded, the Haslip majority stated only that it refused to "draw a mathematical
bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally
unacceptable that would fit every case."' The court did note, however, that the
punitive damage award of $840,000, four times the amount of actual damages,
is "close to the line" of "constitutional impropriety."3 The Court also implied
that an award of punitive damages must bear a rational relation to the amount of
actual damages, noting that the Alabama procedure at issue "ensures that punitive
damages awards are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense
and have some understandable relationship to compensatory damages."'
' 6
With respect to the procedure for adjudicating punitive damages, the Court
declined to set forth any specific procedural safeguards-such as a higher burden
of proof, unanimous jury verdict, special jury instructions, bifurcated trial, or
30. Id. at 282, 109 S. Ct. at 2924.
31. Id. at 280-81, 109 S. Ct. at 2923 (citations omitted).
32. Id. at 281, 109 S. Ct. at 2923 (citations omitted).
33. 499 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
34. Id. at 18, 111 S. Ct. at 1043.
35. Id. at 23-24, 111 S. Ct. at 1046.
36. Id. at 22, 111 S. Ct. at 1045.
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anything else-that must be followed to ensure due process. 7 Instead, the
Court concluded that due process was satisfied simply on the grounds that
Alabama has in place a procedure of post-verdict review to ensure that there are
objective safeguards against unfair punishment. 8
In holding that the jury verdict satisfied due process on the basis of this
post-verdict review, the Haslip majority let stand an award of punitive damages
in which the jury received little more guidance than had the jury in Browning-
Ferris. Not surprisingly, Justice O'Connor was again compelled to write
separately, this time in a dissenting opinion. Justice O'Connor explained that the
jury instructions practically invited "individual jurors to rely upon emotion, bias,
and personal predilections of every sort."39  She further stated that the
instructions "did not suggest what relation, if any, should exist between the harm
caused and the size of the award, nor how to measure the deterrent effect of a
particular award."'
After Haslip was decided, many states reformed their punitive damage
system to provide post-verdict review similar to the Alabama procedure cited
approvingly in Haslip. One such state was West Virginia. Two years after
Haslip was decided, this new West Virginia procedure was put to the test in TXO
Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp."'
TXO involved a ten million dollar punitive damage award that was imposed
against petitioner, TXO Production, for committing a "slander of title" that
resulted in $19,000 in actual damages to the respondent, Alliance Resources.
TXO had, in essence, attempted to defraud Alliance Resources of oil and gas
development rights in West Virginia. Even though the award of punitive
damages was 526 times the award of actual damages, the West Virginia Supreme
Court affirmed.42 On application of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court, much of the debate centered on the sheer amount of the punitive damage
award.
In a plurality opinion, the TXO majority affirmed the award. The Supreme
Court stated that the punitive-to-actual ratio is only "one of several factors" in
determining whether an award crosses the "line" of "constitutional permissibili-
ty.,,43  The plurality opinion did not address the procedure employed to
adjudicate punitive damages in any detail, but instead noted that the system had
been reformed to comply with Haslip." On this basis, the award was affirmed.
Again, Justice O'Connor dissented, this time joined by Justices White and
Souter. Justice O'Connor wrote, "neither this award's size nor the procedures
37. Id. at 58 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 45, 111 S. Ct. at 1057.
40. Id. at 48, 111 S. Ct. at 1059.
41. 113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993).
42. Id. at 2717.
43. Id. at 2721.
44. Id. at 2724.
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that produced it are consistent with the principles this Court articulated in
Haslp."'4 Whether or not the award was consistent with Haslip, one thing that
is clear is that the plurality opinion in TXO provides even less guidance than
Haslip as to what constraints on punitive damages are mandated by the Due
Process Clause.
Then, in 1994, the Supreme Court decided Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg.
46
Unlike TXO, in which the award was 526 times the amount of actual damages,
the award in Oregon was only five times the amount of actual damages. Also
unlike TXO, where the jury received little guidance, the Oberg jury received
detailed jury instructions regarding punitive damages.47 Nevertheless, where the
TXO award had been affirmed, the Oberg award was remanded, primarily
because the Oregon procedure at issue did not provide for the post-verdict review
discussed first in Haslip and second in TXO.48
Most recently, the Supreme Court decided BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore and for the first time actually reversed an award of punitive damages.49
In a 5-4 opinion, the Court found that the $2 million awarded in punitive
damages violated due process where the injury consisted wholly of property
damage and where the actual damages were restricted to $4,000. The Supreme
Court stated that its decision was supported by three factors: the reprehensibility
of the defendant's conduct, the ratio of actual to punitive damages, and the
difference between the punitive award and the sanctions, criminal or otherwise,
that could be opposed for the same conduct.
Nevertheless, in reversing the punitive damage award, the Supreme Court
failed to set forth meaningful guideposts as to whether an award of punitive
damages violates due process. Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Scalia ridiculed the
guideposts that were offered as marking a "road to nowhere. ' Justice Scalia
continued, "The Court has constructed a framework that does not genuinely
constrain, that does not inform state legislatures and lower courts-that does
nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its
essentially ad hoc determination that this particular award of punitive damages
was not fair."51 Thus, BMW will undoubtedly be cited often by defendants as
support for their argument that excessive punitive damages violate due process,
but apart from the fact that this was the result on these particular facts, the
opinion offers little guidance as to what does and does not comply with due
process.
45. Id. at 2728 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
46. 114 S. Ct. 2331, 2335 (1994).
47. Id. at 2334.
48. Id. at 2338.42. Upon remand, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld the original punitive
damage award.





IV. THE LACK OF RESPONSE UNDER THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION
There is only one reported decision that addresses any Louisiana law
providing for punitive damages under either the federal or Louisiana Constitution.
Galjour v. General American Tank Car Corp.2 involved the explosion and fire
of a railroad tank car. The plaintiffs, who claimed personal injury and property
damage, sued defendants and included claims for punitive damages for alleged
reckless handling or transportation of hazardous substances under Louisiana Civil
Code article 2315.3. The defendants moved to dismiss the punitive damage
claim, asserting that Article 2315.3 is unconstitutional on its face.
The defendants relied upon the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitu-
tion and the Equal Protection Clauses of both the Louisiana and federal
Constitutions. 3 Significantly, however, the defendants did not assert any other
protection under the Louisiana Constitution, and did not assert that Louisiana due
process is any broader than federal due process. As noted by the court, "[t]here
is no argument [by defendants] that the due process analysis under the Due
Process Clause of Article I, Section 2 of the Louisiana State Constitution of 1974
is different from the federal analysis under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution."-
For this reason, the court elected to forego any analysis as to whether Article
2315.3 satisfies Louisiana due process or, for that matter, any other section of
the Louisiana Declaration of Rights, other than equal protection set forth in
Article I, Section 3. Similarly, the court did not analyze whether Louisiana equal
protection is satisfied until after it analyzed whether federal equal protection is
satisfied. Analyzing Article 2315.3 in this manner, the court found that the law
was constitutional on its face.
While the result in Galjour is only arguably wrong, the court's methodology
appears clearly wrong. As discussed below, due process under the Louisiana and
federal Constitutions is not the same. Furthermore, there are other sections of
the Louisiana Declaration of Rights that are also implicated by punitive damages.
Finally, the Louisiana Constitution must be looked to before the federal
Constitution is even reached.
It is understandable, however, why the defendants and the court in Galjour
focused on the federal Constitution: the motion was filed soon after the
concurring opinions in Browning-Ferris Industries v. Kelco," and Bankers Life
& Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw.6 As previously discussed, these concurring
opinions gave cause to believe that the United States Supreme Court would find
in the future that punitive damages were greatly constrained by the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. In
52. 764 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. La. 1991).
53. Id. at 1096 n.1.
54. Id. at 1097 n.3.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 26-32.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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fact, it was soon after defendants filed their motion in Galour that the Supreme
Court held in Haslip that punitive damages are constrained by due process.
As discussed above, however, Haslip failed to set forth any guidelines as to
what due process does and does not require--other than some type of meaningful
post-verdict review. It is not surprising, therefore, that while the Gaijour court
withheld its opinion until Haslip was released, it found nothing in Haslip which
required it to alter its conclusion that Article 2315.3 satisfies federal due process.
V. THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE LOOKED TO FIRST
The first flaw in Gajour is that it did not look first to the Louisiana
Constitution in analyzing the constitutionality of Article 2315.3. As the
jurisprudence makes clear, state law, including the state constitution, should be
exhausted before resort is made to the federal Constitution.
This was the precise holding of State v. Perry." In Perry, the Louisiana
Supreme Court considered the question of whether the state of Louisiana could
execute a death row prisoner who was insane, yet capable of understanding the link
between his crime and punishment by taking anti-psychotic drugs. The trial court
had ruled that the state could carry out the death sentence by forcing the prisoner
to take the anti-psychotic drugs, thereby rendering him competent for execution.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the order, finding that it was improper for
a prisoner to be forcibly medicated only to facilitate his execution."'
Of great significance here, the supreme court recognized that the issue in this
case raised both federal and Louisiana constitutional issues, but it found that the
Louisiana Constitution should be addressed first. The Perry court explained,
"[b]oth the United States Supreme Court and this court adhere to the rule that the
court will not pass upon a federal constitutional question, although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed."" The Perry court continued:
Additionally, the Supreme Court has developed the Pullman doctrine,
under which a federal court may decline to proceed though it has
jurisdiction based on the federal constitution or statutes, in order to
avoid decision of a federal constitutional question where the case may
be disposed on questions of state law.6°
57. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 750 (citing Webster v. Reproduction Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 526, 109 S. Ct.
3040, 3060 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-47, 56 S. Ct.
466, 482-83 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Benson & Gold Chevrolet, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor
Vehicle Comm'n, 403 So. 2d 13 (La. 1981)).
60. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 750 (citing Texas v. Pullman, Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S. Ct 643 (1941);
Charles Alan Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 52 (1983); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodeaux, 360 U.S. 25, 79 S. Ct. 1070 (1959); Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 220,
77 S. Ct. 287 (1957)).
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On these grounds, the Perry court concluded that it was mandatory to look at the
Louisiana Constitution before looking to the federal Constitution.
Furthermore, the Perry court found that such an approach is rooted in the
basic concept of federalism. The court explained that "[t]he very nature of our
federal system and the vast differences between the federal and state constitutions
and courts indicate that state law should be applied first. When the Founding
Fathers assembled this nation, they recognized the primacy of the states in
protecting individual rights."'" Thus, the Perry court concluded that it would
be improper to look to federal constitutional law before first seeing whether there
was a remedy available under the Louisiana Constitution.
The court did not stop here, however. It went on to state that the Louisiana
Declaration of Rights is more expansive than the federal Bill of Rights. The
court noted that "because our state Declaration of Rights incorporates or expands
most of the federal Bill of Rights standards, a decision by this court upholding
an individual's state constitutional right rarely will call for further review by the
Supreme Court."'62 Indeed, in the particular case before it, the court relied in
part upon the Louisiana Excessive Punishment Clause, noting that it is broader
in its protection than its federal counterpart in the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.63 The court explained, "[t]he framers of our state
constitution clearly intended for this guarantee to go beyond the scope of the
Eighth Amendment in some respects and to provide at least the same level of
protection as the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment in all others."
Accordingly, Perry and the jurisprudence it cites stand not only for the
proposition that the Louisiana Constitution must be looked to first, but that it, in
fact, provides greater protection than the federal Constitution.
Perry was followed in State v. Hattaway.65 Citing Perry, the Louisiana
Supreme Court explained that "[t]he defendant's appeal raises issues pertaining
to the right to the assistance of counsel under both the Louisiana and federal
constitutions. The appropriate procedure for deciding a case such as this is to
analyze state law, including state constitutional provisions, before reaching a
federal constitutional claim."" Furthermore, since Perry and Hattaway were
decided, their author, Justice Dennis, made certain in two concurrences that their
holdings are not forgotten. In State v. Schirmer,67 Justice Dennis cited Perry
and Hattaway for the same proposition. Similarly, in A. Copeland Enterprises,
61. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 751 (citing Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and
Conservative, 63 Tex. L. Rev. 1081, 1082 (1985) (citing The Federalist Nos. 14, 17, 32, 39 and 45)).
62. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 751.
63. Id. at 762.
64. Id. at 750 (citing State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979)); Lee Hargrave, The
Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 La. L. Rev. 1, 63 (1974).
65. 621 So. 2d 796 (La. 1993).
66. Id. at 800 (citations omitted).




Inc. v. Slidell Memorial Hospital," Justice Dennis wrote, "[g]reater judicial
efficiency and coherence are promoted when we address state law issues
first."'69 Finally, Justice Calogero also ensured that this rule of law is not
forgotten, noting in his concurring opinion in City of Baton Rouge v. Ross"0 that
the court must look to the state Constitution before analyzing issues under the
federal Constitution.
VI. APPLYING THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES
At the outset, it should be noted that as the supreme court held in Perry, the
Louisiana Declaration of Rights is more expansive than the federal Bill of
Rights. In Guidry v. Roberts,7 Justice Tate explained:
As the plaintiff contends, the individual rights guaranteed by our state
constitution's declaration of individual rights (Article I) represent more
specific protections of the individual against governmental power than
those found in the federal constitution's [B]ill of [R]ights, and they may
represent broader protection of the individual.'
So expansive is the Louisiana Declaration of Rights that many of the
protections afforded by it remain unexplored. As one author explained in
introducing his article:
This article addresses the state of civil liberties under the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 as pronounced by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
It also introduces expansive guarantees found in the state constitution
which have remained vastly unexplored territories. In a rush to
vindicate civil rights, attorneys sometimes rush their clients into federal
court under the mistaken notion that somehow the state courts are
inadequate to protect constitutional rights, or that the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. section 1983, is the only means of vindicating civil rights.
This is simply not true. In fact, many times our state constitution
provides broader rights that are generally not assertable in federal
court.73
There are several sections of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights that are
clearly applicable to a claim for punitive damages. These include the right to
68. 657 So. 2d 1292, 1302 (La. 1995) (Dennis, J., concurring).
69. Id. at 1303,
70. 654 So. 2d 1311, 1326, 1335 n.13 (La. 1995) (Calogero, J., concurring).
71. 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976).
72. Id. at 448.
73. Richard P. Bullock, Comment, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974: The Louisiana Supreme Court and Civil Liberties, 51 La. L. Rev. 787, 790 (1991).
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due process,74 the right to property,75 and the right to equal protection.76
These are discussed first.
There are other sections of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights that are
applicable depending upon whether punitive damages are determined to be
sufficiently quasi-criminal in nature so that these additional protections arise.
These include the rights of accused, the protection against double jeopardy,78
and the protection against excessive punishment.79 These sections are discussed
second.
A. Due Process: Article I, Section 2
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due
process of law.
To the extent the United States Supreme Court has recognized any protection
against claims of punitive damages under the federal Constitution, it has been under
federal due process. Under the Louisiana Declaration of Rights, due process has
been interpreted as providing even more expansive rights. Moreover, unlike the
United States Constitution, which protects the right to property only through the
right to due process, the Louisiana Declaration of Rights also sets forth a specific,
separate right to property.'
The same protections which flow from Louisiana due process also flow from
the right to property. These protections are that much stronger because they flow
from both of these constitutional rights. For this reason, rather than discussing
these protections separately, they are discussed together in the following section.
B. Right to Property-Article I, Section 4
Every person has the right to acquire, own, control, use, enjoy, protect,
and dispose of private property. This right is subject to reasonable
statutory restrictions and the reasonable exercise of the police power.
Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political
subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid
to the owner or into court for his benefit. Property shall not be taken or
damaged by any private entity authorized by law to expropriate, exceptfor
a public and necessary purpose and with just compensation paid to the
74. La. Coast. art. I, § 2.
75. La. Coast. art. I, § 4.
76. La. Coast. art. I, § 3.
77. La. Coast. art. I, § 13.
78. La. Coast. art. I, § 15.
79. La. Coast. art. I, § 20.
80. La. Coast. art. 1, § 4.
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owner; in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary
shall be a judicial questions. In every expropriation, a party has the right
to trial by jury to determine compensation, and the owner shall be
compensated to the full extent of his loss. No business enterprise or any
of its assets shall be taken for the purpose of operating that enterprise or
halting competition with a government enterprise. However, a municipal-
ity may expropriate a utility within its jurisdiction.
Personal effects shall never be taken. But thefollowingproperty may
be forfeited and disposed of in a civil proceeding, as provided by law:
contraband drugs; property derived in whole or in part from contraband
drugs; property used in the distribution, transfer, sale, felony possession,
manufacture, or transportation of contraband drugs; property furnished
or intended to be furnished in exchange for contraband drugs; property
used or intended to be used to facilitate any of the above conduct; or other
property because the above described property has been rendered
unavailable.
This Section shall not apply to appropriation ofproperty necessary
for levee and levee drainage purposes.
Unlike the federal Constitution, Louisiana property rights are far broader than
due process; they rise to the level of fundamental rights. As explained by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, "[i]n the federal Constitution, property is protected by
virtue of the due process clauses of the [F]ifth and [F]ourteenth [A]mendments. In
Louisiana however, the constitutional right to private property extends further than
mere due process guarantees against arbitrary deprivations of property; it protects
the right to own property itself."'"
This specific, far-reaching fundamental right yields enhanced protection to
persons who own property at risk of being taken. This specific guarantee,
combined with due process rights, requires enhanced protections to defendants
against claims of punitive damages. Although there are arguably many such
protections--detailed jury charges, a meaningful post-verdict review, a rational
relationship between actual and punitive damages, etc.-this discussion focuses on
two different protections-the right to a bifurcated trial and the right to a
heightened burden of proof.
1. Separate Trials-Merits and Assessment of Punitive Damages
In a case of punitive damages, evidence which is ordinarily inadmissible
becomes material and relevant in damage assessment. Wealth, for example, is a
81. See Bullock, supra note 73, at 800; State v. 1971 Green GMC Van, 354 So. 2d 479, 486
(La. 1977) ("Article I, section four of our Constitution was intended to give 'far reaching new
protection' to the right of citizens to own and control private property. Its languge goes beyond other
state constitutions... and the federal constitution in limiting the power of government to regulate
private property." (citations omitted)).
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factor for the jury to consider in determining how much money damages will
effectively punish the bad actor.' A logical application of and corollary to this
rule is that the amount of insurance coverage available to a defendant is admissible.
Indeed, the argument goes, without it the fact finder would be unable to determine
an adequate amount to award which would actually punish the defendant
individually rather than his insurer. For example, the jury may wish to set damages
at an amount in excess of his insurance coverage limits.
On the other hand, in an ordinary tort claim, the amount of insurance coverage
is clearly inadmissible. 3 Other inconsistencies in admissibility of evidence
between ordinary tort cases and claims for punitive damages include evidence of
prior similar bad acts," other lawsuits against defendant for the same conduct, 5
and prior punitive damage awards.
Similarly, defense strategy is necessarily different between an ordinary tort
case and assessment of punitive damages. In the former, it is difficult to imagine
a situation where a defendant would purposely introduce evidence of a prior award
of punitive damages. Where the amount of punitive damages is being determined,
on the other hand, a defendant who had been punished severely in prior cases would
likely wish to introduce this evidence to minimize any potential additional award
in the present case. 6 This conflict works a substantial unfairness on the defen-
dant. He is unfairly forced to introduce otherwise damaging and inadmissible
evidence. Admitting "wealth" evidence prior to a finding of liability poses a
significant risk of tainting the jury on issues of liability, causation and compensato-
ry damages.8 7 Defendants' rights to a fair trial and an impartial jury are abridged.
In a criminal context, these basic protections are afforded defendants. In
noncapital cases, for example, the trial judge handles sentencing. Accordingly, the
jury should be unaware of inadmissible evidence such as defendant's character,
propensity, and prior criminal convictions.88 In capital cases, evidence of prior
crimes, defendant's character, propensity, impact of the victim's death on others,
and related matters are admissible only once guilt has been determined, and then
in a separate phase of the trial.89
In a civil case in state court, however, the trial judge apparently lacks even the
discretion to bifurcate the merits and punitive damage claims. Code of Civil
82. See Angeron v. Martin, 649 So. 2d 40, 44 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994); Demarest v.
Progressive Am. Ins. Co., 552 So. 2d 1329, 1334 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989); Levet v. Calais & Sons,
Inc., 514 So. 2d 153, 159 n.5 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1987); cf. Galjour v. General Am. Tank Car Corp.,
764 F. Supp. 1093, 1099 (E.D. La. 1991).
83. La. Code Evid. art. 411.
84. La. Code Evid. art. 404; Brannan v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 516 So. 2d 157 (La. App 5th Cir.
1987), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 526 So. 2d 1101 (1988).
85. La. Code Evid. arts. 404, 406.
86. This assumes arguendo that double jeopardy would not attach. See infra note 208 and
accompanying text.
87. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994).
88. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 871.
89. See generally La. Code Crim. P. art. 905.2.
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Procedure article 1562(a) permits separate trials on liability, damages and other
issues only with the consent of all parties."o This is precisely why this protection
must be found to flow from the Louisiana Constitution. Pursuant to the basic rights
provided by Louisiana due process and the right to property, bifurcation of the
merits claim, on the one hand, and quantification of the claim for punitive damages,
on the other hand, should be not only discretionary, but mandatory.
Although the United States Supreme Court declined to require bifurcation
on federal grounds in Haslip, Justice O'Connor encouraged state legislatures to
enact statutory bifurcation rules for punitive damage trials.9 Some states have
done so, either by statute or jurisprudential rule. 2 Many of the jurisdictions
which segregate the assessment of punitive damages from the trial of the
principal merits simply bifurcate punitive liability and damages from the
remainder of the trial.93 At least one state requires the trial judge to fix the
amount of punitive damages, after the jury has determined punitive liability."
Another requires "trifurcation": liability and compensatory damages are tried in
the first phase, liability for punitive damages in the second, and the amount of
punitive damages in the third.9' Still other states require a prima facie showing
of entitlement to punitive damages prior to admitting otherwise inadmissible
evidence, such as wealth of the defendant. 96
None of these states afford any greater state constitutional protection to
property owners than the right to property found in Article 1, Section 4 of the
Louisiana Constitution. Because the prospect of having to try the underlying tort
claim and assessment of punitive damages together is inherently unfair to the
defendant, it is suggested here that the right to bifurcation must be found to flow
under due process and the right to property.
90. La. Code Civ. P. art. 1562(A). Article 1562 contrasts with Article 1631 which empowers
courts "to control the proceedings at trial, so that justice is done." Article 1562 also contrasts with
La. Code Civ. P. art. 593.1(c) which permits the trial judge to separate trials of various issues in
cases where a class has been certified, regardless of the parties' consent.
91. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 58, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1084 (1991).
92. Cal. Civ. Code § 3295(d) (West Supp. 1996); Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1(d) (West Supp.
1995); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3071(a), (b) (1993); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 549.20(4) (West Supp. 1996);
Miss. 1993 Regular Session H.B. 1270 (effective July 1, 1993); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 510.263 (Vernon
Supp. 1996); Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-221(7) (1991); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 42.005(3) (1991); NJ. Stat.
Ann. § 2A: 58C-5 (b) (West 1995); N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-11(2)-(4) (1993); Simpson v.
Pittsburg Coming Corp., 901 F.2d 277, 283 (2d Cir. 1990) (New York law); Rupert v. Sellers, 367
N.Y.S.2d 904, 912 (N.Y. App. Div. 1975); Hodges v. S. C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901-02
(Tenn. 1992); Transportation Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 30 n.28 (rex. 1994); Utah Code
Ann. § 78-18-1(2) (Supp. 1995); Campen v. Stone, 635 P.2d 1121,1132 (Wyo. 1981). Seegenerally
Raymond B. Landry, Punitive Damages and Jury Trials, 43 La. B.J. 264 (1995) (discussion on
separating the trials of liability/damages from punitive liability damages).
93. See Landry, supra note 92, at 267 n.31.
94. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2315.21(C) (Baldwin 1993).
95. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A: 58C-5(b) (West 1995).
96. See, e.g., Straus v. Biggs, 525 A.2d 992, 996 (Del. 1987); Harley Davidson Motor Co. v.
Wisniewski, 437 A.2d 700 (Md. App. 1981).
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2. Heightened Burden of Proof
Due process and the right to property would be at great risk if punitive
damages were available upon proof by a simple preponderance of the evidence.
The historical development of punitive damage awards, a consideration of why the
legislature has authorized them, and an analysis of analogous Louisiana jurispru-
dence verifies that a heightened standard of proof should be required for recovery
of punitive damages.
Ordinary civil cases require proof by preponderance of the evidence.97 Cases
where fundamental rights are jeopardized require a heightened standard of proof.
Common examples are criminal cases, contempt and forfeiture proceedings, and
defamation actions.
The burden of proof issue addressed in contempt proceedings is instructive
here. These proceedings require proof beyond a reasonable doubt if deemed
criminal whereas civil contempt proceedings require proof by a preponderance of
the evidence. In Estate of Graham v. Levy," the first circuit distinguished
between the two. Civil contempt is "remedial or coercive," and criminal contempt
is "punitive and intended to vindicate the authority of the Court." A claim for
punitive damages, which is also necessarily "punitive," is much more akin to
criminal contempt than to civil contempt. Thus, a heightened burden of proof
should also be required for a claim for punitive damages.
Similarly, in forfeiture actions, the right to property guaranteed by the
Louisiana Constitution is jeopardized. The Green Van-Manuel-SpoonerI" trilogy
and the legislative response to those cases delineates enhanced burdens for
forfeiture actions. To prove a right to forfeiture, the State bears the initial burden
of proving the property is derivative contraband.' Once it meets this threshold,
the State must next prove beyond a reasonable doubt the validity of grounds for
forfeiture, conformity of the seizure to applicable law, and the elements of proof
set forth in the forfeiture statute.1 2 Moreover, forfeiture actions may be brought
97. Lasha v. Olin Corp, 625 So. 2d 1002 (La. 1993); Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 245 So. 2d
151 (La. 1971); Bacharach v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 212 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. La. 1963).
98. 636 So. 2d 287 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1993), writ-denied, 639 So. 2d 1167 (1994).
99. Graham, 636 So. 2d at 290.
100. State v. 1971 Green GMC Van, 354 So. 2d 479 (La. 1977); State v. Manuel, 426 So. 2d
140 (La. 1983); State v. Spooner, 520 So. 2d 336 (La. 1988). In 1989, Article I, Section 4 of the
Louisiana Constitution was amended to clarify that forfeitures of drugs and drug contraband are civil
proceedings. Thus, there is at least an intention to qualify these forfeitures as "civil" so as to negate
constitutional protections against multiple presentations, self-incrimination and excessive punishment.
See State v. Johnson, 667 So. 2d 510 (La. 1996).
101. Spooner, 520 So. 2d at 336.
102. Manuel, 426 So. 2d at 147. See also State v. Davis, 580 So. 2d 1046 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1991). The four specific elements of proof are as follows: (1) valid grounds exist for forfeiture of
the property under the statute which do not conflict with the constitution; (2) the seizure was in
conformity with the constitution and the law and was made upon reasonable grounds to believe that
it so conforms; (3) the owner of the conveyance was knowingly and intentionally a consenting party
or privy to a violation of the controlled dangerous substances statute; and, (4) the value of the
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even where the owner of the property sought to be forfeited is either acquitted of
the charges or the charges are dismissed. Under those circumstances, however, the
legislature has created a presumption that the property is not subject to forfeiture,
which may be overcome by the State only by "demonstrating a compelling reason
by clear and convincing evidence."' 3
In civil defamation actions, the standard of proof is by a preponderance of the
evidence,"° unless specifically guaranteed constitutional rights come into play.
When free speech and free press rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution are at issue, the United States Supreme Court and
Louisiana Supreme Court have set specific minimum requirements. Public figures
must prove actual malice on the part of persons who make false statements about
them in order to recover civil damages for defamation." Actual malice must be
proved with "convincing clarity."'" Moreover, when claiming punitive damages,
civil defamation litigants are required to prove their case with "clear and
convincing evidence."'0" In Kidder v. Anderson,"° the Louisiana Supreme
Court recognized that holding a public figure to a lesser standard than clear and
convincing evidence would have a chilling effect on protected free speech. The
requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence in punitive damage cases
was the accommodation reached between competing interests of civil defamation
law and freedom of speech and press)'9
In response to New York Times v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., and
at the prompting of the governor, the Louisiana legislature in 1976 created a cause
of action for punitive damages in defamation cases."' That punitive damage
statute did not specifically spell out the applicable standard ofproof. However, due
to the potential for impingement upon free speech rights, Louisiana courts required
proof by clear and convincing evidence, thereby showing that where a constitution-
al right is at stake, a heightened burden of proof should be required."'
Twenty eight states, the District of Columbia, and the territory of the United
States Virgin Islands require a higher standard of proof in punitive damage cases
contraband was in excess of $500 or the contraband was intended for commercial sale. Davis, 580
So. 2d at 1049 (citing Manuel, 426 So. 2d at 147).
103. See La. R.S. 32:1550(C)(4) (1989); see also Davis, 580 So. 2d at 1049.
104. See Melancon v. Hyatt Corp., 589 So. 2d 1186 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991), writ denied, 592
So. 2d 411 (1992).
105. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964).
106. Id. at 285-86, 84 S. Ct. at 729.
107. Gertz v. Robert Welsh Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3008 (1974).
108. 354 So. 2d 1306, 1308 (La. 1978).
109. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325, 94 S. Ct. at 3000.
110. La. Civ. Code art. 2315.1, repealed by 1980 La. Acts No. 324, provided:
In addition to general and special damages, the plaintiff who obtains a judgment because
of having been defamed, libeled or slandered may be awarded punitive damages and
reasonable attorneys fees, if it is proved that the defamatory, libelous or slanderous
statement upon which the action is based was made with, knowledge of its falsity or with
wreckless disregard of whether it was false or not.
111. See Kidder, 354 So. 2d at 1308.
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than a preponderance of the evidence. Colorado requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt." 2 The others require some heightened standard, either clear
and convincing evidence or some other similar standard."'
The only Louisiana case located which addresses whether a heightened
burden of proof is required is GaIjour. The district judge, in the course of his
federal due process analysis, analyzed burden of proof. Noting that Haslip did
not require a higher standard of proof under the United States Constitution, the
court concluded that a heightened burden of proof is not required. However, no
discussion was afforded the Louisiana right to property guaranteed by Article I,
Section 4 of the Louisiana Declaration of Rights. No accommodation, therefore,
was specifically discussed between the competing rights of punishing wrongdoers
and the constitutional right to property. Instead, the Gaijour court deferred to
the Louisiana legislature.' 14
112. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-25-127(2) (Supp. 1996).
113. The states requiring some version of clear and convincing evidence in punitive damage
cases, and the corresponding statutory and jurisprudential authority are as follows:
Alabama: Ala. Code § 6-11-20(a) (1993);
Alaska: Alaska Stat. § 09.17.020 (Supp. 1986);
Arizona: Linithicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675 (1986);
California: Cal. Civ. Code § 3294(a) (West 1987);
District of Columbia: Raynor v. U.S. District Court, 643 F. Supp. 238 (D.D.C. 1986);
Florida: Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.73(1)(b) (West 1988);
Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1(b) (1987);
Hawaii: Masaki v. General Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 574-75 (Haw. 1989);
Indiana: Ind. Code § 34-4-34.2 (1986);
Iowa: Iowa Code Ann. § 668A.1 (West 1986);
Kansas: Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3701(c); 7.1.88 (1995 Supp.);
Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.184; 7.15.88 (1991);
Maine: Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985);
Maryland: Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 602 A.2d 1182 (Md. 1992);
Minnesota: Minn. Stat. § 549.20(1) (1996 Supp.);
Missouri: Joseph v. Elam, 709 S.W.2d 517 (Mo. App. 1986);
Mississippi: 1993 Regular Session H.B. 1270 (effective July 1, 1993);
Montana: Mont. Code Ann. § 27-1-221 (1996);
Nevada: Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42.005(1) (1995);
New York: Roginsky v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1962);
North Dakota: N.D. Cent. Code § 32-03.2-11 (1995);
Ohio: Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2315.21(C)(3) (1995 Supp);
Oregon: Or. Rev. Stat. § 41.315 (1) 1987; repealed 1995, now: 18.535 (1995);
South Carolina: S.C. Code Ann. § 15-33-135 (Law. Co-op. 1995);
South Dakota: S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 21-4.1 (1995);
Utah: Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 (1)(a) (1989) (does not apply in D.U.I. context);
Virginia: Great Coastal Express, Inc. v. Ellington, 334 S.E.2d 846 (Va. 1985);
U.S. Virgin Islands Territory: Acosta v. Honda Motor Co., 717 F.2d 828 (3d Cir. 1983);
and V. I. Code Ann. Tit. 22 § 815(b));
West Virginia: Muzelak v. King Chevrolet, Inc., 368 S.E.2d 710, 715 (W. Va. 1988).
114. Galjour v. General Am. Tank Car Corp., 764 F. Supp. 1093, 1100-01 (E.D. La. 1991).
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This is not a matter for the Louisiana legislature. Rather, the Louisiana
Constitution mandates enhanced protection given the competing interests of the
right to property and the legislature's desire to punish certain behavior with
exemplary damages. As shown above, there is ample precedent for requiring a
heightened burden of proofwhen a constitutional right is implicated. Accordingly,
it is suggested here that pursuant to the Louisiana right to property as well as due
process, a claim for punitive damages should require proof by at least clear and
convincing evidence.
C. Equal Protection-Article I, Section 3
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall
discriminate against a person because of race or religious ideas, beliefs,
or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of birth, age, sex, culture, physical
condition, or political ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary
servitude are prohibited, except in the latter case aspunishmentfor crime.
The Louisiana equal protection clause was viewed for sometime as a
restatement of federal Fourteenth Amendment equal protection.' As early as
1976, however, courts began to acknowledge that Article I, Section 3 has a wider
ambit than federal equal protection. In Guidry v. Roberts,"6 Justice Summers,
dissenting, observed that Louisiana equal protection rights appear "far broader and
more definitely articulated" than those found in the Fourteenth Amendment." 7
Justice Dennis, concurring in Burmaster,"' questioned the majority's finding that
Louisiana equal protection duplicates federal constitutional standards." 9
In Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University,'" a case
involving a challenge to the $500,000 cap on medical malpractice claims,' 2' the
Louisiana Supreme Court formally rejected the federal three tier system for equal
protection analysis. The court found that the federal system is "in disarray and has
failed to provide a theoretically sound frame work for constitutional adjudica-
tion. ' 122 Instead, when a classification is based upon an enumerated class, or a
115. Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980); Burmaster v. Gravity Drainage Dist. No.
2, 366 So. 2d 1381 (La. 1976); State v. Barton, 315 So. 2d 289 (La. 1975).
116. 335 So. 2d 438 (La. 1976) (Summers, J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 452.
118. 366 So. 2d at 1388 (Dennis, J., concurring).
119. Id. at 1388; See generally Bullock, supra note 73, at 796-99; Michael Lester Berry, Jr.,
Comment, Equal Protection-the Louisiana Experience in Departing From Generally Accepted
Federal Analysis, 49 La. L Rev. 903 (1989).
120. 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985), on remand, 490 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied,
496 So. 2d 325 (1986).
121. See La. R.S. 40:1299.39 (1992).
122. 477 So. 2d at 1107.
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constitutionally guaranteed right is impinged, a heightened test must be applied.
Specifically, under Sibley there is an absolute ban on all laws which discriminate
on the basis of race or religious beliefs. For other enumerated classes, there must
be a showing that no arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable discrimination is created
by the classification, and that the statute substantially furthers a legitimate state's
objective." In this manner, "judicial attention would be focused on the merits
of a case and not diverted toward abstract theories. "124
The Louisiana Supreme Court seemed to retreat from this analysis in Crier v.
Whitecloud.1 2 Crier presented a challenge to the three year preemptive period
on medical malpractice claims. 26  Holding that there was no impermissible
classification under Article I, Section 3, the court applied a "minimal level of
scrutiny.' ' 27  Although the court did not specifically rely on federal jurispru-
dence, it appeared as though it was applying the federal rational relation standard.
Justice Dennis dissented, observing that Crier's application of the second layer in
Sibley rendered it "in reality non existent.
12
The court applied the heightened second level scrutiny set forth in Sibley two
years after deciding Crier in Kirk v. State.'29 In Kirk, a challenge to the
prohibition of nonconsensual recording of conversations was presented.' Under
federal law, it is likely that the minimum scrutiny would have been applied. The
Kirk court, however, applied Sibley scrutiny, holding the statute to the test of
substantially furthering a legitimate state objective.' It did not pass muster.
Thus, it appears clear that the Sibley analysis should be employed when
analyzing Louisiana equal protection, but it is by no means clear what this means
for the constitutionality of punitive damages. It is clear that under federal equal
protection analysis, most punitive damage schemes will withstand scrutiny. This
is because under federal equal protection analysis, federal courts have refused to
apply any form of heightened scrutiny for wealth based classifications.
Defender Industries, Inc. v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co.'
illustrates the typical federal approach. Northwestern, who insured Defender,
123. Id. at 1104.
124. Id.
125. 496 So. 2d 305 (La. 1986).
126. Id. at 306-07.
127. Id. at 311.
128. Id. at 313. Justice Dennis went on to observe that Sibley scrutiny was merited for any
classification: "when a law classifies individuals on any basis, it shall be rejected whenever a
member of a disadvantaged class shows that it does not suitably further any appropriate states
interest." Id. (emphasis added).
129. 526 So. 2d 223 (La. 1988).
130. La. R.S. 14:322.1 prohibited recording of confidential conversations without the consent
of all parties, yet did not apply to the state, thus permitting prosecutors to use statements recorded
with the consent of only one party. La. R.S. 14:322.1 (1990), repealed by 1991 La. Acts No. 795,
§ 3.
131. 526 So. 2d at 226-27.
132. 809 F. Supp. 400 (D.S.C. 1992).
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fraudulently breached a promise to refund a portion of a group life insurance
policy.'33 When Defender pressed for a partial return of the premium,
Northwestern threatened to interfere with Defender's business relations with its
largest customer. A jury found actual damages slightly in excess of $100,000,
and awarded punitive damages of $5,000,000." 4 Northwestern, among other
points, argued that South Carolina's punitive damage scheme improperly
discriminated against the wealthy, thus violating the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
35
The district judge began his equal protection analysis by questioning whether
punitive damages in South Carolina "operate to the disadvantage of some suspect
class or impinge upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by
the Constitution." 1 36  Under federal law, creating a suspect classification or
impinging upon a fundamental right would require strict scrutiny analysis; in
effect, the scheme would have to promote a compelling state interest.'
3
Otherwise, the minimal rational relationship test would be employed.'
The Defender court addressed two cases cited by Northwestern in which
discrimination based on monetary means was treated with a heightened level of
scrutiny. In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Electors, 39 a poll tax was
found to be unconstitutional. The Defender court observed that this monetary
discrimination impinged upon the fundamental right to vote. Similarly, in Griffin
v. Illinois,'" an Illinois statute made it difficult for the poor to obtain appellate
review. This monetary-based discrimination was an unconstitutional impinge-
ment on the right to a fair trial. The Defender court found that South Carolina's
punitive damage scheme was different because the increased monetary
punishment against wealthier defendants served to effect a proportionally equal
deterrent among persons who behave egregiously. The equal deterrent, in turn,
tended to reduce fraud, no matter what one's economic status. Thus, employing
minimum scrutiny, the Defender court found the South Carolina's punitive
damage law rationally related to the state's interest of deterring fraud. 4'
While Defender illustrates why punitive damage schemes will generally
withstand attack under federal equal protection analysis, it is not nearly so clear
that the same is true under Louisiana equal protection analysis. As previously
noted, the only Louisiana case squarely addressing a Louisiana equal protection
133. Id. at 401.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 408.
136. Id. (quoting San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1288
(1973) (emphasis added)).
137. 809 F. Supp. at 408 (citing Hemendez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 74 S. Ct. 667 (1954)).
138. Id. at 408 (citing Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312, 96 S. Ct.
2562, 2566 (1976) (legislative scheme upheld if "rationally related to firthering a legitimate state
interest")).
139. 383 U.S. 663, 86 S. Ct. 1079 (1966).
140. 351 U.S. 12, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956).
141. Defender, 809 F. Supp. at 409.
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attack on punitive damages, GaIjour v. General American Tank Corp.,142
rejected an attack on Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3 under Louisiana equal
protection, but it is at least arguable that Gajour did not correctly apply
Louisiana equal protection analysis.
The Gajour court correctly recognized the Sibley rejection of the federal
three-tier approach when interpreting Article I, Section 3 of the Louisiana
Constitution. However, the Galjour court found Article 2315.3 to be a
classification "based on a particular business or industry, [and] not a classifica-
tion based on race or religion, nor on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture,
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliation."' 43 Thus, the court shifted
the burden to defendants to show that the classification does not suitably further
any appropriate state's interest." Finding Louisiana's "legitimate state interest
of protecting the public from injury from hazardous or toxic substances, " '4S the
court rejected the equal protection challenge.
What the Gallour court failed to do was recognize the impingement on a
specifically enumerated fundamental right under the Louisiana Constitu-
tion-specifically, the right to property guaranteed by Article 1, Section 4 of the
Louisiana Declaration of Rights, a more specific and broader right than that
found in the United States Constitution. When other fundamental rights have
been impinged by an economically discriminatory statute, even the United States
Supreme Court has placed the burden upon the state to show that the economic
discrimination is necessary to promoting a compelling state interest. Louisiana's
equal protection clause, even broader than the Fourteenth Amendment, certainly
does not warrant a lesser degree of scrutiny. Thus, it is arguable that because
punitive damages implicate the fundamental Louisiana right to property, the state
should be held to the burden of showing that the article is necessary to fulfill a
compelling state interest.
It is doubtful whether the state could make this showing, at least as punitive
damages are currently being applied in Louisiana. In Louisiana, as in many
other states, courts allow introduction of evidence of the wealth and economic
fortitude of defendants who stand to be punished. This practice furthers, and
indeed encourages, the argument that wealthier defendants must be punished with
larger sums of money in order to further the stated goals of "teaching the
defendant a lesson," deterring others, and providing an incentive to plaintiffs to
pursue potentially limitless damages without regard to the actual compensatory
damages incurred. 46 As long as this practice is employed, some defendants
are subjected to the possibility of greater punishment simply because of their
economic standing. Because this punishment directly implicates these defend-
142. 764 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. La. 1991).
143. Id. at 1104.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Billiot v. British Petroleum Oil Co., 645 So. 2d 604, 612-13 (La. 1994).
19961
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
ants' fundamental right to property, it is questionable whether this practice
complies with Louisiana equal protection.
D. Excessive Punishment-Article , Section 20
No law shall subject any person to euthanasia, to torture, or to cruel,
excessive, or unusual punishment. Full rights of citizenship shall be
restored upon termination of state and federal supervision following
conviction for any offense.
Similar to the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the
Louisiana Constitution guarantees humane treatment. Louisiana's protection,
however, goes further, prohibiting excessive punishment. Not long after the
enactment of the 1974 Constitution, the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the
new and important dimension added by Article I, Section 20. In State v.
Sepulvado,47 Justice Tate observed:
The deliberate inclusion of a prohibition against "excessive" as well as
"cruel and unusual" punishment adds an additional constitutional
dimension to judicial imposition and review of sentences... The
Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution prohibits "cruel and
unusual" punishments. .. ?"
Punishment which is so out of proportion to the severity of the offense that
it inflicts unnecessary pain or suffering is unconstitutional.' Even punish-
ments within a delineated statutory range may be excessive viewed in light of the
individual defendant and the circumstances of the offense.", The codal
punitive damage articles leave much to be desired in terms of guidance on
permissible damage awards. Particularly, no range of damages is specified, no
ceiling or floor is provided, no factors for a jury to consider in assessing
quantum are identified, and otherwise no concrete guidance is offered for
determination of the propriety of such awards.
As explained previously, the United States Supreme Court held in Browning-
Ferris that the Eighth Amendment is not applicable to civil cases.' This holding
was followed in Gal/our, the only case which has considered the constitutionality
of a Louisiana codal punitive damages article. Galfour, however, did not recognize
147. 367 So. 2d 762 (La. 1979).
148. Id. at 764; see also Bullock, supra note 73, at 811-12; Hargrave, supra note 64, at 62-65.
149. State v. Reed, 409 So. 2d 266 (La. 1982).
150. See State v. Thomas, 447 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (La. 1984); State v. Quiebedeaux, 424 So. 2d
1009 (La. 1982); State v. Grey, 408 So. 2d 1239 (La. 1982); State v. Sepulvado, 367 So. 2d 762 (La.
1979).




that the excessive punishment clause contained in the Louisiana Declaration of
Rights at Article I, Section 20 is different in its scope and purpose.
Under the excessive punishment clause, unlike under the cruel and unusual
punishment clause, labeling a punitive damage scheme "civil" should not be
determinative of the inquiry whether it is actually criminal in its application. On the
contrary, even a statute which is designated civil may implicate the excessive
punishment clause if it is quasi-criminal in its scope and effect. Similarly, a statute
sufficiently quasi-criminal in nature may implicate protection against double
jeopardy and self-incrimination. In order to determine whether the Louisiana codal
punitive damage articles are quasi-criminal in their scope and effect, this article
addresses (1) the analysis of the parallel issue under the Eighth Amendment; (2) the
history of punitive damages in general and in Louisiana in particular; and (3)
present day application of punitive damages in Louisiana.
1. Federal Analysis
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court has held that punitive
damages do not implicate the Cruel and Unusual Clause of the Eighth Amendment,
but federal courts have recognized that the distinction between civil and criminal
in a punitive damage context is not an easy one to assess. "The notion of
punishment, as we commonly understand it, cuts across the division between civil
and criminal law,...."" If the goal of punishment is served, a sanction labeled
civil may in fact be criminal.'53 Punishment serves the twin aims of retribution
and deterrence."5 4 Neither retribution nor deterrence are legitimate "non-
punitive" objectives. 5
In the context of a civil punitive damage claim under Vermont law, the United
States Supreme Court found in Browning-Ferris, that civil punitive damages
generally do not qualify as quasi-criminal for the purpose of protection under the
United States Constitution. 6  The Court conducted an exhaustive Eighth
Amendment analysis of punitive damage claims among private parties when the
government is not acting as prosecutor, and where the fine exacted was not to be
shared by the state. The Browning-Ferris analysis traces the historical development
of punitive damages in England, from pre-Magna Carta abuses through the 1689
English Bill of Rights and ultimately the Eighth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.'57 The distinction between civil and criminal in English law,
however, has little to do with Louisiana law. As shown below, those historical
developments are unlike what was experienced in France.
152. United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 447-48, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1901 (1989).
153. Id.; see also Samuel v. Home Run, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 548 (S.D. Ind. 1992).
154. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963).
155. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20, 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1874 n.20 (1979).
156. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280, 109 S. Ct. 2909,
2923 (1989).
157. Id. at 268-80, 109 S. Ct. at 2916-21.
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Browning-Ferris was not the first time a federal court had considered whether
a statute exacting fines or pecuniary penalties is civil. Whether the penalty scheme
is "essentially criminal" is the crux of this determination. For instance, in
Helvering v. Mitchell,'58 Mr. Helvering attempted to invoke the double jeopardy
clause in a secondary tax deficiency assessment proceeding. The Court observed:
Remedial sanctions may be of varying types. One which is characteris-
tically free of the punitive criminal element is revocation of a privilege
voluntarily granted. 59
The Court went on to observe that a two-level analysis is required to determine
whether a forfeiture statute is quasi-criminal. First, Congress' express or implied
intentions should be determined. Second, a court must address whether the
statutory scheme was "so punitive either in purpose or effect to negate" the
intention to impose a civil penalty." °
Seven factors were presented in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez' for
analyzing whether a statute is essentially criminal, as opposed to regulatory or civil.
In Kennedy the Court was presented consolidated cases against individuals whose
citizenship rights were attacked as a result of failures to honor armed services
obligations or commitments. The individuals whose citizenship rights were at risk
argued that the statutory schemes at issue were, in effect, criminal punish-
ments.162 Justice Goldberg delineated seven factors to consider:
1) Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint;
2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment;
3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter;
4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punish-
ment-retribution and deterrence;
5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime;
6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected
is assignable to it; and
7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose as-
signed.
63
A balancing of the Kennedy factors lean heavily towards a determination that
even under this federal analysis, the codal punitive damage articles provide a quasi-
criminal punishment rather than a civil sanction. This is because the conduct
proscribed by each of the codal articles is largely criminal. Article 2315.7
158. 303 U.S. 391, 58 S. Ct. 630 (1938).
159. Id. at 399-400, 58 S. Ct. at 633.
160. United States v. One Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 362-63, 104 S. Ct. 1099,
1105 (1983) (quoting United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, 100 S. Ct. 2636, 2641 (1980)).
161. 372 U.S. 144, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963).
162. Id. at 147-52, 83 S. Ct. at 556-59.
163. Id. at 168-69, 83 S. Ct. at 567-68.
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sanctions "wanton and reckless activity" through criminal sexual activity.'" By
definition, criminal activity is required. Article 2315.4 punishes drunk driving,
which is also criminal activity.'" Recently repealed Article 2315.3 punishes
those who "wantonly or recklessly" handle, store or transport hazardous materials.
Most of the behavior punishable under Article 2315.3 is also criminal activity. For
example, criminal penalties exist for those who handle hazardous materials in a
manner that endangers or could endanger human life or health.'" Similarly, one
who handles hazardous waste in a careless or imprudent manner without regard for
the hazards of the material or the circumstances of his actions commits a
misdemeanor.'67 One who willfully or knowingly discharges certain hazardous
materials in any way that endanger human life or health may be fined up to
$1,000,000 or imprisoned.' 68 Thus, Article 2315.3 was also designed to punish
behavior which is largely criminal.
In essence, the only conduct subject to punitive damages in Louisiana is that
which is also criminal in nature. Accordingly, under the controlling federal law,
a persuasive argument can be made that even the Eighth Amendment should be
found to constrain Louisiana punitive damages.
Irrespective, however, of whether the Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause applies, there is even a more compelling argument, based on a
historical analysis of the Louisiana scheme and its present day application, that the
Louisiana Excessive Punishment Clause constrains punitive damages.
2. Historical Analysis
Louisiana's civil law derives from French law, which is inherently different
from the English common law analyzed in Browning-Ferris. It is not the
purpose of this article to analyze in detail the historical development of French
law. However, a brief discussion of French law, and even earlier treatment of
punitive damages is helpful.
Punishing a criminal wrongdoer with a monetary fine is a practice which
dates to the earliest known Codes of law. The Code of Hammurabi, circa 2000
B.C., 169 and the Code of Lipit-Ishtar, 7° dating from approximately 1968
B.C., are among the two earliest known codes. Both set forth monetary penalties
for certain breaches of the public order.' Most other organized primitive
164. La. Civ. Code art 2315.7.
165. 155 La. R.S. 14:98 (1986 & Supp. 1996).
166. La. R.S. 32:1518 (1989 & Supp. 1996).
167. La. R.S. 32:1520 (1989 & Supp. 1996).
168. La. R.S. 30:2025(F) (1989 & Supp. 1996).
169. Linda L. Schlueter and Kenneth R. Redden, Punitive Damages § 1.1 (3d ed. 1995) (citing
Albert Kockourek & John H. Wigmore, 1 Sources of Ancient and Primitive Law (1915)).
170. See 52 Amer. J. of Archeology 425 (1948).
171. The Code of Hammurabi, for example, assessed a thirty fold penalty from a man stealing
an ox, sheep, ass or pig from a Temple, or ten fold penalty for stealing one of these animals from
a free man; a ten fold penalty to the shepherd who acts fraudulently, which payment was due directly
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cultures had some system of criminal laws, which often provided for multiple
money damages under certain circumstances. Among these are the Babylonian
Empire (2000 to 1000 B.C.), 2 Hittite Law (circa 1400 B.C.), 73 early Hindu
civilization (circa 200 B.C.), 17 4 early Greek codes,"'S Egyptian Law,'7 6 and
Mosaic law.
17
Under the Lex Salica, the earliest code of laws governing what is now
France, 7 1 the concept of compromise, or "composition" was introduced.
Families at private war as a result of wrongs done to one another were directed
to resolve their dispute based on a schedule of monetary penalties, known as
"weregeld." Weregeld, roughly translated as "man money," was a stipulated
monetary fine, payable directly to the victim or his family for a breach of the
public order. Gradations of weregeld existed, dependent upon the status and
nationality of the victim, and public offensiveness of the act."
79
Following the French Revolution, a Declaration of Rights was produced,
declaring equality among men and before the law." ° A criminal code was
drafted in 1791. The Code PNnal de 1791 sought to correct the harshness of the
French monarchical period by limiting crimes to those things which actually
harmed society, and reducing the severity of many punishments.'
During this time frame, the Constituent Assembly was formed for the
purpose of drafting the French Constitution of 1791, among other things. That
assembly expressed an intention to compile a general code of France. Despite
to the owner of the sheep, among many other penalties. See Schlueter & Redden, supra note 169,
at 2.
The Code of Lipit-Ishtar, Ruler of Isin from 1968 to 1957 b.c. exacted a monetary fine for various
activities, including those which disrupted the agricultural society existing at that time. For example,
stealing from anothers orchard resulted in a fine of ten sheldes of silver, and cutting down the tree
in the garden of another subjected the wrongdoer to a fine of one-half mina of silver, among various
other sanctions for other types of activity. See 52 Amer. J. of Archeology 425 (1948).
172. Babylonian law provided for multiple damages in various instances, including which were
conversion of goods or money by carrier or depositories. See Schlueter & Redden, supra note 169,
at 2 n.2 (citing H.F. Jolowicz, The Assessment of Penalties in Primitive Law, Cambridge Legal
Essays (1926)).
173. Schlueter & Redden, supra note 169, at 2 n.3 An example is offered of stealing of animals,
which resulted in a gradiated system of repayment of multiple animals, the quality and age of which
were specified.
174. Id. at 2 n.4. See also Sir Henry S. Maine, Ancient Law 17-18 (9th ed. 1863).
175. Schlueter & Redden, supra note 169, at 2 n.4 (citing Plato, Protagoras 342(b); Plato, Laws
9.85(b) and 9.93(a)).
176. Id. at § 1.2, at 3.
177. Id. (citing Exodus 22:1 and 22:9). Exodus 22:1 obliges one who steals an ox or sheep, and
fails to return it, to restore the owner of the ox five fold, or the owner of sheep four fold. Exodus
22:9 provides a double damage penalty for trespass. Id.
178. See Katherine Sherman, The Birth of France (Random House 1987).
179. Jean Brissaud, A History of French Public Law, IX The Continental Legal History Series
111-12 (1915).




this intention, politics and disagreement among scholars regarding how to
compile French law slowed the process. In 1800 a plan for compiling a French
Civil Code was agreed upon.' Ultimately, on March 21, 1804, the code Civil
de Francais was promulgated.
Other codes of French laws were prepared during this immediate time frame,
including two which addressed criminal law. Unique to French law was Article
3 of the original Code of Criminal Procedure. A proceeding known as partie
civille was created, permitting a criminal victim to bring a civil action at the
same time, and in the same court proceeding as the public prosecution." This
procedure carried forward the long-standing history of recognizing a crime
victim's claim for damages as a component of exacting retribution for the
offense. However, the concept of providing a monetary premium or added
penalty directly to the victim was not carried over in Louisiana law.
On December 20, 1803, after periods of Spanish and French rule, the United
States took possession of the Louisiana Territory.' Still, the Louisiana people
were reluctant to embrace a common law system, and their opposition ultimately
was successful.
On March 31, 1808, the Governor approved a Digest of Civil Law, which
subsequently became the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808. The redactors followed
as a model:
preparatory works of the French Civil Code as well as the finished text
of that Code. The 1808 Digest contained 2,160 articles. One thousand
five hundred sixteen of these articles, about 70% of the whole,
corresponded with, and were based upon, provisions of the French
Projet de Gouvernement of 1800 or the Napoleanic Code.s
Louisiana's embrace of post-French Revolution French law took place
partially in vacuum. Specifically, the Louisiana legislature did not embrace the
ancient concept of composition or the more modem French partie civille action
because Louisiana was already a state when these Codes were adopted.
Louisiana's punitive damages articles, however, have a similar effect. Indeed,
pursuant to these articles, private citizens are encouraged to act as private
attorneys general by seeking redress for conduct which is criminal in nature.
Accordingly, if any state's punitive damage scheme is quasi-punitive in nature,
it is that of Louisiana-a state which traces its legal roots not to English
common law, but rather to French civil law.
182. Id. at 69.
183. Id. at 186 (citing Jean Henry Claude Mangin, Trait6 de L'action Publique et de L'action
en Matiere Criminelle (3d ed.) (rev. by Albert Sorel) (Paris 1870), Vol. 2, § 31-13)).
184. La. Civ. Code, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, XXIX (West 1995 ed.).
185. Id. at XXI.
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3. Present Day Application of Punitive Damages in Louisiana
Louisiana punitive damages have been held to serve three state's purposes:
o Penalize and punish defendants committing legislatively prohibited
acts;
o Deter others;
o Provide an incentive or "bounty" to private parties to act as prosecu-
tor of penal laws." 6
In Billiot v. British Petroleum Oil Company, the plaintiff, a refinery laborer,
was burned while working for his statutory employer.'87 While changing the
filter in a pressurized vessel, he was sprayed and burned with a toxic chemical, but
he was injured only because the chemical was hot.' He sought'damages under
Civil Code article 2315.3 against his employer and a co-employee. The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor Billiot's employer on two bases: BP was
immune under the .worker's compensation law, and Billiot failed to meet the
-summary judgment standard for establishing that his injuries were caused by the
toxic or hazardous nature of the substance. 9 The court analyzed in detail the
purpose and policies of the exclusive remedy provision of the worker's compensa-
tion law vis-a-vis the nature and scope of Article 2315.3 punitive damages.
Rather than exacting dollar for dollar retribution for bad acts, the court noted
that "[p]unitive damages are regarded as a fine or penalty for the protection of the
public interest.""lg Additionally, the court stated that "teaching the defendant not
to do it again,''. and deterring others from copying the punitive defendant's
behavior are among the reasons for permitting punitive damages. As important to
the court, however, was the effect which punitive damages have in encouraging
plaintiffs to aggressively prosecute punitive damage cases:
Another justification for the punitive or exemplary award is that it
provides an incentive to the plaintiff to sue in cases where the public
interest requires some action against the defendant, but, in the absence of
a punitive award, the plaintiff might be insufficiently encouraged to bring
186. Billiot v. British Petroleum Oil Co., 645 So. 2d 604, 612-13 (La. 1984).
187. Id. at 607.
188. Id. at 607.
189. Id. at 607.
190. Id. at 612 (citing Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 287, 297,
109 S. Ct. 2909, 2926-27, 2931-32 (1989) (O'Conner J., concurring and dissenting in part);
International Bd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42,48, 99 S. Ct. 2121, 2125-26 (1979) (quoting
Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 350, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3012 (1974); Thomas Galligan, Jr., Augmented
Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 La. L. Rev. 3, 30 (1990); John Calvin
Jeffries, A Comment On The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 Va. L. Rev. 139, 148 0986);
Prosser and Keeton On Torts 1-2 at 9 (5th ed. 1984); 1 Linda L. Schleuter and Kenneth Redden,
Punitive Damages § 2.2 (A) (1) (2d ed. 1989)).
191. Billiot, 645 So. 2d at 612.
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a civil action or press criminal charges. The punitive award under this
theory is viewed as a bounty, or as an incentive to the plaintiff to act as a
kind of "private attorney general."''
Thus, the supreme court's description of punitive damages in Billiot, like the
history of punitive damages discussed above, reveals a scheme which has as its
primary purpose the punishment of defendants by private citizens who have been
cloaked with governmental authority to protect the public interest. In short, the
punitive damage scheme is quasi-criminal. Accordingly, this also supports
affording the right against excessive punishment to these defendants, just as
defendants are afforded this protection against more typical prosecution to protect
the public interest.
Indeed, advocates for punitive damages acknowledge the interwoven nature of
criminal sanctions and "civil" punitive damages. One recent commentator stated
that, "egregous misbehavior deserves punishment. This is the fundamental premise
of criminal law and exemplary damages."'93 That writer argued that neither the
marketplace nor a publicly electedjudiciary effectively regulate corporate America,
and, accordingly, juries should be permitted to do so.'" "Strict procedural
safeguards" found in criminal cases such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt and
other constitutional constraints were viewed by that writer as an impediment to
"ascribing criminal responsibility to individuals within a corporation.""'
Cautioning that "America will be a less safe and less fair country in which to
live" "9 with limits on punitive damage claims, that writer, oddly enough, seems
to suggest that the ends of criminal punishment should be effected without
constitutional safeguards. In codal punitive damages cases, private plaintiffs take
on a public prosecutoral role. Public prosecutors, acting on behalf of the state, are
bound by the constitutional guarantees of the Louisiana Constitution. Those who
act as "bounty hunters" should be no less bound.
The Louisiana legislature has sought to address this deficiency in its punitive
damage scheme. Senate Bill Number 580 would have capped punitive damages at
five times general and special damages. Awards in excess of that amount would
result in a remittitur to the highest awardable amount. '97 That proposal, along
with a handful of others, was introduced in the wake of Billiot. Some remedial
legislation made its way through the legislative process.' Other legislation,
however, which would have assured a variety of basic constitutional protections
was not passed.
192. Id. (citing Dan B. Dobbs, Remedies § 3.9 (1973)).
193. Drew Ranier, Pro: Exemplary Damages: Checks and Balances on Corporate America,
43 La. B.J. 256 (1995).
194. Id. at 257-58.
195. Id. at 256.
196. Id. at 259.
197. 1995 S.B. no. 580.
198. See La. R.S. 23:1032(a)(1)(a).
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Constitutional rights, however, are not dependent upon legislative whim from
session to session. Indeed, our Constitution exists to afford basic protection
against those whims. The current statutory language, particularly the lack of
guidance on quantification of awards, presents a real and substantial risk of
excessive punitive damages awards. Judicial recognition of existing rights under
the Louisiana Constitution is needed, particularly the right to be protected against
excessive punishment.
How much, then, is enough, or would be permissible? The question calls
for some minimum bright line boundary. The requirement of a logical
relationship between actual loss and extent of punishment predates the civil code.
Most legal cultures have traditionally used a multiple of damages. Interests of
consistency and predictability support a limit in the form of a multiple of actual
damages. Whether a multiple or some other bright line boundary is adopted, the
right against excessive punishment should be recognized.
E. Double Jeopardy--Article I, Section 15
No person shall be twice placed In Jeopardy for the same offense,
except on his application for new trial, when a mistrial is declared, or
when a motion of arrest ofjudgment has been sustained.'"
This protection against multiple prosecutions also applies if the codal
punitive damage articles are quasi-criminal. As discussed above, the codal
articles are more criminal than civil in their scope and application. It is
submitted, therefore, that this constitutional protection attaches.
Multiple prosecutions are prohibited by Article I, Section 15 of the Louisiana
Constitution. Though similar to federal double jeopardy prohibition, the broader
protection of property rights found in Louisiana Constitution enhances multiple
prosecution protection in the context of punitive damages.
Three basic protections are afforded. First, persons are protected against a
second prosecution once they have been acquitted on the same charge. Second,
they are protected against a second prosecution once they have been convicted
of that charge. Third, multiple prosecutions for the same offense are prohibit-
ed.200 The concept of protecting persons from multiple prosecutions dates back
to the Seventeenth Century. In its "Body of Liberties" the Colony of Massachu-
setts provided: "No man shall be twise sentenced by Civill Justice for one and
the same crime, offense or Trespasse."' O'
199. La. Const. art. I, § 15.
200. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S. Ct. 2072, 2076 (1969).
201. American Historic Documents 1000-1904, 43 Harvard Classics 66, 72 (C. Eliot ed. 1910),
quoted by United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 440, 109 S. Ct. 1892, 1987 (1989).
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The Framers of the United States Constitution embraced this guarantee.m
The prohibition against punishments or prosecutions for the same offense has been
considered well settled within the jurisprudence for over a century.2 3 Federal
courts have analyzed whether multiple punitive damage prosecutions may require
double jeopardy protection under the United States Constitution.
Civil sanctions may operate as an additional criminal punishment in certain
contexts. The United States Supreme Court recognized that, "[a] defendant who
already has been punished in a criminal prosecution may not be subjected to an
additional civil sanction to the extent that the second sanction may not fairly be
characterized as remedial, but only as deterrent or retribution." 2°0 Determination
whether a civil punishment is a second prosecution, thus, turns on the effect of the
civil sanction, whether intended or actual.
In Halper, a False Claims Act prosecution was found to be a second
punishment in violation of the double jeopardy provision of the United States
Constitution. The Court relied heavily on an earlier case, U.S. ex rel Marcus v.
Hess,20 5 which was a qui tam proceeding against electrical contractors for bid
collusion and fraud. In Hess, the government stood to gain much more than full
reparation for damages. Qui tam proceedings, however, have as a principal purpose
restoration of the government to roughly its previously whole position. Thus, in
Hess, that qui tam proceeding was found to violate double jeopardy protection.
The Halper Court refused to extend Fifth Amendment double jeopardy
protection to private litigants.' 6 Some federal courts have refused to extend
double jeopardy protection to litigants in punitive damage cases, relying on
Halper."7 The broader double jeopardy protection found in the Louisiana
Constitution, however, does not produce the same result.
Like the federal courts, Louisiana courts apply double jeopardy "only to
actions intended to authorize criminal punishment to vindicate public justice."
In Louisiana State Board of Mental Examiners v. Booth, the first circuit held that
some ostensibly "civil" actions subject defendant to jeopardy within the meaning
of the double jeopardy clause.2°" Multiple revocation proceedings against a
dentist were found to fall outside of double jeopardy protection in Allen v.
Louisiana State Board of Dentistry.21 ° Critical to this holding was the finding
that the revocation proceedings in question were not "quasi criminal" proceedings.
202. 1 Annals of Cong. 434 (1789-1791) (Joseph Gales, Sr. ed. 1834); see also Halper, 490 U.S.
at 440.
203. See Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S. Ct. 1892; Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1874).
204. Halper, 490 U.S. at 448-49, 109 S. Ct. at 1902.
205. 317 U.S. 537, 63 S. Ct. 379 (1943) (hereinafter "Hess"].
206. Halper, 490 U.S. at 451, 109 S. Ct. at 1892.
207. See, e.g., Leonen v. Johns-Manville Corp., 717 F. Supp. 272 (D.N.J. 1989).
208. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners v. Booth, 76 So. 2d 15, 19 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1954).
209. Id.
210. 603 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
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Unlike Booth or Allen, the essential bases for an award of damages under the
codal punitive damages articles are to punish and deter. Because these proceedings
are more criminal than civil in nature, double jeopardy protection attaches.
This is particularly important in cases where a defendant stands to be sued by
many persons for the same conduct. Typical examples are multiple suits, often in
multiple court venues, for a single toxic emission or a chain collision automobile
accident caused by a drunk driver. Moreover, creative "bounty hunters," now
encouraged by the hope of limitless punitive damages, are constantly seeking to
extend the punitive damage articles beyond their intended scope. For example,
ordinary motor oil was recently argued to be a hazardous substance under article
2315.3 to legitimate a claim for punitive damages in a plain vanilla automotive
collision case.
In Chutz v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.,' the supreme court rejected plaintiff's
arguments that a truck hauling motor oil was hauling a hazardous substance."
While Chutz properly rejects a bizarre extension of article 2315.3, it illustrates the
heightened interest demonstrated by the new age "bounty hunters" in extending the
scope of punitive damages. Multiple prosecutions for one course of conduct is
exactly what double jeopardy is intended to prohibit. Under the Louisiana
Constitution that no more than one bite at the punitive damage apple for a single act
should be permitted.
F. Self Incrimination Rights-Article I, Section 13
When any person has been arrested or detained in connection with the
investigation or commission or any offense, he shall be advisedfully ofthe
reason for his arrest or detention, his right to remain silent, his right
against self incrimination, his right to the assistance of counsel and, if
indigent, his right to court appointed counsel. In a criminal prosecution,
an accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. At each stage of the proceedings, every person is entitled to
assistance of counsel of his choice, or appointed by the court if he is
indigent and charged with an offense punishable by imprisonment. The
legislature shall provide for a uniform system for securing and compen-
sating qualified counsel for indigents.
There are vast differences between the treatment of civil litigants and criminal
defendants in terms of compelling their testimony. Under the Fifth Amendment of
the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Louisiana Constitu-
tion, a criminal defendant's right to remain silent, and to refuse to incriminate
himself by sworn testimony is held inviolate. Civil litigants, however, are subject
211. 662 So. 2d 450 (La. 1995).
212. The court did not address the issue whether there must be a causal relationship between the
injury claimed and the hazardous substance being hauled, stored or transported. Id. at 451.
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to a vast array of discovery, often requiring sworn testimony or attestation of the
truthfulness of discovery responses. Unless specifically charged with a crime, or
subject to criminal charges on a specific issue, a civil litigant may be ordered to
testify under penalty of contempt. Once testifying, that litigant is subject to the
penalty of perjury.
Whether the right against self incrimination applies in codal punitive damage
cases turns on whether these claims are criminal or civil. As addressed in detail
above, the codal punitive damage articles appear to be quasi-criminal sanctions.
Thus, there exists a good argument that the right against self incrimination should
apply.
Article I, Section 13 provides rights potentially greater than those which flow
from the United States Constitution Fifth Amendment. The 1974 Constitutional
Convention embraced the then-existing federal Fifth Amendment case law into
Louisiana's protection against self-incrimination. The high water mark federal
jurisprudence sets the minimum standard for Louisiana. Specifically, "[t]here was
an intention by the Convention to go beyond Miranda and to require more of the
State regarding [the guarantee against self incrimination]."2"3 In State in the
Interest ofDino, the Louisiana Supreme Court considered the taking of a statement
from a juvenile defendant without an attorney present.' 4 Acknowledging a shift
to the conservative right in federal interpretations of the Fifth Amendment,2 s the
Dino court found that Article I, Section 13 "enhanced and incorporated prophylac-
tic rules of Miranda."' 6 Dino goes on to hold that any constriction or limitation
of Miranda by the United States Supreme Court which results in "significant
deprivation of freedom of action" does not restrict the rights afforded by Article I,
Section 13 in a commensurate way."17 Thus, as federal jurisprudential interpreta-
tions of the guarantee against self-incrimination ebb and flow to the right and back,
Louisiana's minimum standard embraces the broad guarantees crafted by the
Warren Court.
Fifth Amendment protection has been frequently extended by federal courts in
forfeiture actions. Over a century ago, the Supreme Court extended the right of
self-incrimination in quasi-criminal suits for penalties and forfeitures."' To the
extent forfeiture actions are quasi-criminal, federal courts continue to extend Fifth
Amendment protection.219 If not quasi-criminal, however, Fifth Amendment
protection is traditionally not extended.' °
213. State In the Interest of Dino, 359 So. 2d 586, 590 (La. 1978).
214. Id.
215. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S. Ct. 711 (1977).
216. Dino, 359 So. 2d at 589.
217. Id. at 590.
218. See Boyd v. U.S., 116 U.S. 616,6S. Ct. 524 (1886).
219. See U.S. v. Mades, 787 F. Supp. 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Federal Fourth and Fifth
Amendment protection afforded to quasi-criminal defendants, but no double jeopardy protection, as
not a true criminal defendant); Gordon v. U.S., 634 F. Supp. 12 (Cir. 1986)).
220. See U.S. v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).
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In a civil context, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal recently
acknowledged an Article I, Section 13 right to effective assistance of counsel.
In Jambois v. Jambois,z22 a pro se litigant was in arrears on child support and
alimony pendente lite. The trial judge ordered him to serve ninety days in jail.
Plaintiff participated in most of the proceedings without an attorney, yet had
court appointed counsel at a contempt hearing. The court found that the
proceeding was essentially quasi-criminal and that "due process requirements of
effective assistance of counsel should apply."'
No Louisiana cases were located in which a punitive damages defendant
asserted his Article I, Section 13 rights against self-incrimination as to sworn
testimony or pre-trial discovery. There exists a good argument, however, that
these rights apply on this same basis. This is particularly true when it is
remembered that exposure to punitive damages under the codal articles
corresponds to criminal exposure. For example, a defendant confronting a claim
for punitive damages under Article 2315.7 for alleged criminal sexual activity
should not be compelled to testify against himself. Compelling testimony from
this defendant would abridge his Article I, Section 13 rights. The same rationale
would apply to a defendant confronting a claim for punitive damages under
Article 2315.4 for drunk driving or under recently repealed Article 2315.3 for
reckless handling of hazardous substances. Like the other rights discussed above,
the Louisiana Constitution may very well guarantee this protection.
VII. CONCLUSION
At present, a defendant confronting a punitive damage claim in Louisiana
is placed in an difficult situation. He will be subject to a finding of liability
simply upon the jury concluding that it is more likely than not that he engaged
in the proscribed conduct, as vaguely defined as this conduct may be. In state
court, it will not matter that three of the twelve jurors feel that the defendant is
not liable for anything. It also will not matter that the defendant may be exposed
for criminal prosecution for this same conduct, or even that the defendant may
have even already been tried in criminal court for the same conduct. Indeed, at
least up to this point, no court will even afford the defendant the basic protection
against self-incrimination or double jeopardy.
At the same time that the jury determines whether the defendant is liable for
punitive damages, it will also go forward to assess these damages if liability is
found. As a result, the defendant will be effectively foreclosed from presenting
evidence which would mitigate against high punitive damages, such as previous
awards, etc., because it would prejudice the jury against him on the merits. For
the same reason, the plaintiff will, on the other hand, be allowed to introduce
evidence which is routinely inadmissible, such as the degree of defendant's
221. 598 So. 2d 1237 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
222. Id. at 1239.
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wealth. Indeed, the jury will be told to consider awarding more punitive
damages against the defendant if he is wealthy. Many of these problems would
be alleviated simply by bifurcating liability and assessment of punitive damages,
but at least up to this point, no court has found a constitutional right to do so.
If the jury does award punitive damages, it will be given virtually unfettered
discretion to award whatever punitive damages it sees fit. The award might not
be reversed even if it is over five hundred times the award of actual damages.
In very real terms, the defendant who is alleged to have caused $10,000 of actual
damages may be found liable for $5 million of punitive damages, enough to put
even a thriving corporation out of business. Indeed, there will be no specific
limit on the amount of punitive damages that may be awarded. It also will not
matter that other defendants have received much less or much greater punishment
for the same conduct.
This parade of horribles is not theoretical; it confronts many defendants as
this article is written. These defendants routinely invoke their rights under the
federal Constitution, arguing that such arbitrary punishment is impermissible. Up
to this point, however, a divided United States Supreme Court has done little to
clarify exactly how punitive damages are constrained by the federal Constitution.
As shown in this article, a defendant in Louisiana should not have to resort
to the federal Constitution. On the contrary, the federal Constitution should not
be reached until after the Louisiana Constitution is considered. Moreover, since
it is clear that the Louisiana Declaration of Rights affords much greater
protection than the federal Bill of Rights, it should never be necessary to reach
the federal Constitution. Many of the inequities in the present system should be
solved by applying this Declaration of Rights, thereby resulting in a system
which provides ample deterrence against conduct which is contrary to the public
welfare, but which does so without its cost being the wholesale deprivation of
constitutional rights.
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